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1255 
TOSSING THE RED FLAG: OFFICIAL (JUDICIAL) 
REVIEW AND SHAREHOLDER-FAN ACTIVISM 
IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLICLY TRADED 
SPORTS TEAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
For some, it comes after their team squanders away a fourth quarter 
lead in the playoffs, engages in a hasty trade,
1
 or makes an ill-advised 
substitution. For others, an indefensible draft choice, announcement of 
team relocation,
2
 or decision not to re-sign a star player
3
 triggers the 
thought. Whether at a sports bar or on their own living room couch, at one 
time or another, every sports fan has transported him or herself to the 
owner’s box and imagined, “If I ran that team, things would be different.” 
Although the average fantasy league owner may envision leading his team 
to the Promised Land on the field, the pressures in the front office, with 
the need to balance stadium financing, ticket and concession sales, and 
upcoming contract negotiations, make the business of sports an entirely 
different ballgame. 
In the last fourteen years the professional sports world has survived 
seven bankruptcy filings
4
 and nearly collapsed in 2011, when two major 
 
 
 1. See Jonathan Abrams, Celtics Break Up Their Fantastic 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/sports/basketball/25nba.html; Greg Payne, Doc Rivers: Timing of 
Trade was Off, ESPN.COM (May 16, 2011, 4:27 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/nba/news/story 
?id=6555870 (suggesting the Celtics’ management’s decision to trade Kendrick Perkins led to a 
decline in team chemistry and, ultimately, a poor playoff performance). 
 2. See Mary Foster, Owners Approve Hornets’ Move to New Orleans, USA TODAY (May 10, 
2002, 8:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nba/hornets/2002-05-10-owners-relocation.htm 
(describing the voting process as only involving team owners and that a defeated arena finance 
referendum played a large role in the decision to move); Associated Press, Sonics Tell NBA of Intent to 
Move SuperSonics to Oklahoma City, ESPN.COM (Nov. 3, 2007, 1:20 AM) [hereinafter Sonics Tell 
NBA], http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3091416 (describing financial troubles that forced 
team owners to relocate); Andrew Adam Newman, Pro Bono Campaign Aims to Keep the Kings in 
Sacramento, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/business/media/02ad 
co.html (illustrating the efforts that fans and community members will undertake to keep their team 
from relocating due to budget constraints). 
 3. See Paul Coro, Phoenix Suns Ex-Star Amar’e Stoudemire Felt Unappreciated, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Jan. 6, 2011, 9:16 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/sports/suns/articles/2011/01/06/201101 
06phoenix-suns-amare-stoudemire-unappreciated.html (describing the Suns’ inability to negotiate a 
maximum contract and failure to convey Stoudemire’s value to the team); William C. Rhoden, 
Cleveland’s Venom Validates James’s Exit, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/10/sports/basketball/10rhoden.html (illustrating fans’ anger and betrayal over LeBron James’s 
departure to Miami as many burned his jersey in the streets of Cleveland). 
 4. Steven Church & Dawn McCarty, Dallas Stars, L.A. Dodgers Make Delaware Home Court 
for Sports Bankruptcies, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
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leagues locked out their players and shut down operations.
5
 More than 
two-thirds of the teams comprising the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) operated at a loss during the 2009 season.
6
 Coupled with the 
 
 
2011-09-30/dallas-stars-l-a-dodgers-make-delaware-home-court-for-sport-bankruptcies.html; see also 
Steven Church, Cubs File Bankruptcy, Plan Sale to Ricketts Family, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 12, 2009, 
5:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7Piey9m.a7g; Jonathan 
Stempel, Texas Rangers file bankruptcy, REUTERS (May 24, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2010/05/24/us-texasrangers-bankruptcy-idUSTRE64N41N20100524; Craig Harris & Carrie 
Watters, Coyotes File for Bankruptcy; Move to Canada Next? USA TODAY (May 6, 2009, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/coyotes/2009-05-05-Balsillie-offer-to-buy-phoenix-coyot 
es_N.htm. 
 5. The NFL lockout, which lasted 136 days, beginning in March 2011, was the first experienced 
by the league since 1987. See Vinnie Iyer & Clifton Brown, NFL Lockout Ends as Owners, Player 
Reps Agree to 10-Year CBA (Jul. 25, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/feed/2010-09/nfl-
labor-talks/story/nfl-lockout-ends-owners-nflpa-10-year-deal-2011-season-cba-labor-agreement; Simon 
Evans, NFL Announces Lockout of Players, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://www.re 
uters.com/article/2011/03/12/us-nfl-lockout-idUSTRE72B25I20110312. Although the NFL season has 
since commenced, the NBA struggled immensely to solve labor disputes of its own and played a 
shortened 66-game season after a 161-day lockout to begin the 2011 season. Steve Aschburner, Sides 
Make Deal Official, Camps Begin Friday, NBA.COM (Dec. 8, 2011, 9:09 PM), http://www.nba.com/20 
11/news/features/steve_aschburner/12/08/labor-agreement/index.html. More recently, the National 
Hockey League announced a players strike on September 15, 2012. Katie Strang, NHL Imposes 
League-Wide Lockout, ESPN.COM (Sept. 16, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://espn.go.com/nhl/story/_/id/838 
2911/nhl-officially-locks-players-cba-expires. As of December 17, the league had been locked out for 
92 days, which has resulted in the cancellation of 527 total games. Brian Stubits, NHL Lockout: NHL 
Cancels Games Through Dec. 30, CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:08 AM), http://www.cbssports 
.com/nhl/blog/eye-on-hockey/21346694/nhl-lockout-nhl-to-cancel-games-through-dec-30-on-monday. 
On January 6, 2013, 113 days after announcing a lockout, the NHL and its union, the National Hockey 
League Players’ Assocation (NHLPA), reached a tentative agreement. Katie Strang, NHL, Union Have 
Tentative Agreement, ESPN.COM (Jan. 6, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://espn.go.com/nhl/story/_/id/8817955/ 
nhl-nhlpa-reach-tentative-agreement. Nevertheless, in addition to disappointing fans and the players, 
the NHL lockout claimed countless victims in local businesses at thrive in stadium areas. See, e.g., 
Toronto Associated Press, Study: Lockout Hurting Businesses, FOXSPORTS.COM (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:44 
PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nhl/story/lockout-hits-canadian-merchants-near-arenas-120412 (finding 
that business is down by about 35 percent for bars and about 11 percent for restaurants near hockey 
stadiums in Winnipeg, Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, and Calgary); Josh Brown & Josh Cooper, NHL 
Lockout Taking Toll on Nashville Businesses, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2012, 9:03 AM), http://www.usa 
today.com/story/sports/nhl/predators/2012/11/26/nashville-nhl-lockout-impact/1726529/ (describing 
the struggles of local Nashville business owners during the NHL lockout); Ashley Yarchin, NHL 
Lockout Leads to More Fallout for St. Louis Businesses, KSDK.COM (Nov. 25, 2012, 1:18 AM), 
http://www.ksdk.com/news/article/348699/3/NHL-lockout-leads-to-more-fallout-for-St-Louis-busines 
ses (same). 
 6. See NBA Team Values: The Business of Basketball, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/lists/ 
2011/32/basketball-valuations-11_rank.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) [hereinafter NBA Team Values] 
(indicating that seventeen of the thirty teams in the NBA operated at a loss during the 2009–2010 
season); Chad Ford, Can George Cohen Save NBA’s Season?, ESPN.COM (Oct. 17, 2011), http://espn 
.go.com/nba/story/_/page/mediator-111018/nba-lockout-george-cohen-save-season (suggesting that up 
to 22 or 23 teams could stand to lose money under the current regime). But see Nate Silver, Calling 
Foul on N.B.A.’s Claims of Financial Distress, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://fivethirty 
eight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/calling-foul-on-n-b-a-s-claims-of-financial-distress/ (arguing that 
the five to seven percent operating margin of the NBA is well within the operating margin of most 
Fortune 500 companies); Larry Coon, Is the NBA Really Losing Money?, ESPN.COM (July 12, 2011, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/4
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debilitating effects of the current extended economic instability, all 
professional franchises should be reevaluating their ownership structures 
and investigating new sources of revenue.
7
 Although the notion of a 
publicly owned and traded sports team is not a new business revelation,
8
 
current economic conditions have reactivated largely dormant discussions 
of the opportunity.
9
 A publicly owned and traded model for sports teams is 
versatile, serving the interests of several constituencies, yet brings distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. Rather than evaluate these benefits and 
 
 
12:39 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=coon_larry&page=NBAFinancial 
s-110630 (suggesting that several teams’ reported losses are fictitious—a function of methods of 
accounting rather than pure losses). 
 7. Recent ownership turnover amongst professional sports teams may provide an opportunity to 
explore these new options. Earlier in the spring, Shahid Khan paid $760 million to take control of the 
NFL’s Jacksonville Jaguars. Simon Evans, New Jacksonville Owner Has Grand Plans for Jaguars, 
REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/us-nfl-khan-idUSTRE 
8241O720120305. Emerging from a section 363 bankruptcy sale, baseball’s Los Angeles Dodgers 
landed in the hands of an ownership group headed by Earvin “Magic” Johnson. See Jamie Mason, 
Dodgers to be Sold for Record $2B, THE DEAL PIPELINE (Mar. 28, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.the 
deal.com/content/restructuring/dodgers-to-be-sold-for-record-2b.php; Matthew Futterman, $2 Billion 
Dodgers Price Tag Shatters Records: Group Led by Magic Johnson Wins Baseball Team with Bid of 
$2.15 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424 
052702303404704577308483250633906.html. Yet another baseball franchise under new management 
is the San Diego Padres, whose sale to the O’Malley family and PGA tour standout Phil Mickelson 
garnered league approval on August 16, 2012. Eric Matuszewski, Padres’ Sale to O’Malley Family, 
Golfer Mickelson Backed by MLB, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2012-08-16/padres-sale-to-o-malley-family-phil-mickelson-approved-by-mlb. Perhaps the biggest 
recent headline in the sports world came when Manchester United, the international soccer giant, 
announced an initial public offering. Lee Spears & Tariq Panja, Manchester United Seeks Up to $333 
Million in IPO, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 31, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-30/ 
manchester-united-seeks-up-to-333-million-in-ipo. 
 8. See, e.g., Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings and Professional Sports Teams: The 
Regulations Work, but Are Owners and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 139 (2000); 
Brian R. Cheffins, Playing the Stock Market: “Going Public” and Professional Team Sports, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 641 (1999); Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for Professional Sports 
Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69 (2010); Ryan Schaffer, A Piece of the 
Rock (or the Rockets): The Viability of Widespread Public Offerings of Professional Sports 
Franchises, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 201 (2006); Eugene J. Stroz, Jr., Public Ownership of Sports 
Franchises: Investment, Novelty, or Fraud?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 517 (2001); see also John K. Harris, 
Jr., Fiduciary Duties of Professional Team Sports Franchise Owners, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 255 
(1992). 
 9. See, e.g., Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 70–71 (citing the Minnesota Twins, Chicago 
White Sox, Pittsburgh Pirates, San Francisco Giants, Philadelphia Phillies, and Sacramento Kings as 
giving serious consideration to going public); Jeffrey Goldfarb, Mets Owner Could Find Financial 
Solution in Stands, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/2011/02/15/mets-
owner-could-find-financial-solution-in-stands/ (suggesting that an initial public offering would “ease 
[the owner’s] financial burden”); see also Associated Press, 76ers Officially Sold to New Owners, 
ESPN.COM (Oct. 18, 2011, 7:59 PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7117764/joshua-harris-david-
blitzer-jason-levien-smith-part-new-philadelphia-76ers-ownership-group (highlighting the underlying 
principles of public ownership in the team’s website, NewSixersOwner.com, which “solicit[s] fan 
feedback in an attempt to energize the fan base”). 
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drawbacks from the owner’s box, this Note examines the publicly owned 
and traded model of sports teams as a means of checks and balances—a 
mechanism for fan-shareholders to hold majority owners accountable for 
their decisions on and off the field of play. 
While the decisions posed throughout this analysis are ultimately left to 
current sports team ownership, this Note is meant to serve as a thought 
experiment to provoke questions and to spark discussion regarding the 
viability of a public model of sports team ownership. In an expansion upon 
preceding scholarship, I hope not only to highlight the corporate 
governance implications of such a model, but also to bring the concepts to 
life, using numerous contemporary examples to drive the discussion. 
Part I describes the three models of public ownership that have been 
implemented in recent years, while Parts II and III identify the various 
advantages and disadvantages of public ownership of sports franchises. 
Part IV then introduces a basic overview of rudimentary corporate law 
concepts that would undoubtedly come into play should a sports team 
pursue a public ownership model. In an attempt to marry corporate law 
theories with their practical application, Parts V, VI, and VIII draw on 
real-life examples to bring the corporate law concepts to life. These 
illustrations provide further analysis and pose numerous questions related 
to instances in which shareholders might pursue collective action. Part VII 
proposes a new corporate structure for sports franchise owners to consider. 
Limited liability companies and limited partnerships maximize the parties’ 
contractual freedom while allowing them to modify or eliminate fiduciary 
duties. Finally, Part IX highlights additional considerations, including 
negative externalities, which may also factor into a sports team’s decision 
to “go public.” 
I. VARIATIONS AND CURRENT EXAMPLES OF PUBLICLY OWNED AND 
TRADED SPORTS TEAMS 
Three primary forms of public sports team ownership exist. First, the 
most common form of public ownership in this context arises when a large 
publicly traded corporation owns a sports franchise as just a small slice of 
its operating portfolio.
10
 As part of a diversified portfolio, an indirectly 
traded sports franchise generates a trivial portion of the corporation’s 
profits. For example, the Anaheim Angels of Major League Baseball 
(MLB) and Ducks of the National Hockey League (NHL) were at one time 
 
 
 10. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/4
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owned by corporate giant Disney.
11
 Thus, when evaluating the viability 
and potential for financial return of these franchises, fan-investors 
contemplate the financial health of Disney—whose primary business and 
other holdings greatly outweigh the profit generated by the Ducks and 
Angels. This other business, not the franchise, ultimately drives the stock’s 
value.
12
 
Yet a second, largely unused, but wildly successful model of public 
ownership is the community-owned franchise—a nonprofit corporation 
that sells shares to generate capital but does not grant equity ownership or 
other benefits to its shareholders.
13
 Rather than earn a return on their 
investment or receive dividends, shareholders of a community-owned 
sports team derive purely sentimental value from stock ownership.
14
 The 
National Football League’s (NFL) Green Bay Packers is the only sports 
franchise that has adopted this community-ownership model, and the 
franchise has enjoyed incredible success since 1923.
15
 After five stock 
sales to the general public (1923, 1935, 1950, and two in 1997), nearly 
112,000 shareholders, holding 4.75 million shares of stock, now own a 
slice of the storied franchise.
16
 In 2011, the Packers initiated another 
public offering in order to fund renovations to historic Lambeau Field.
17
 
 
 
 11. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 205 (describing numerous publicly traded media, entertainment, 
and communications companies that at one time owned professional sports teams); see also Garrett & 
Green, supra note 8, at 71–72 (describing a similar relationship of corporate ownership between the 
Fox Group and the Los Angeles Dodgers before being acquired by current owner Frank McCourt). See 
Arash Markazi, AEG Being Put up for Sale, ESPN.COM (Sept. 19, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://espn.go 
.com/espn/print?id=8397131&type=story, for an interesting issue that arises when a conglomerate, 
which owns a sports franchise, is placed under new ownership. 
 12. See Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 71–72 (illustrating the same relationship applied to the 
Dodgers and its former owner, the Fox Group). 
 13. E.g., Shareholders, PACKERS.COM, http://www.packers.com/community/shareholders.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (describing the history and basic information regarding the Green Bay 
Packers’ stock ownership); see also Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 90; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 
206. 
 14. See generally Stroz, supra note 8, at 542, 548 (“Fans will likely get more enjoyment out of 
framing their stock certificate, bragging of their ownership to friends, and attending the annual 
meetings (with or without the ability to vote) than they will from a return on the investment.”). 
 15.  Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 90; see also Schaffer, supra note 8, at 206; supra note 13 
and accompanying text. 
 16. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 206. 
 17.  Associated Press, Want to be an NFL Owner? Packers Plan First Stock Sale Since ’97, 
NFL.COM (Oct. 10, 2011, 4:36 PM) [hereinafter Want to be an NFL Owner?], http://www.nfl.com/ 
news/story/09000d5d823017f9/article/want-to-be-an-nfl-owner-packers-plan-first-stock-sale-since-97 
(describing that the offering is meant to fund renovations to Lambeau Field and shares will be sold for 
$200 each). The team’s most recent stock offering began on December 6, 2011 and concluded on 
February 29, 2012. Shareholders, PACKERS.COM, http://www.packers.com/community/sharehold 
ers.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). Upon completion of the offering, the organization sold over 
268,000 shares and added more than 250,000 new shareholders. Id. Proceeds from the offering will 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although shareholders retain voting rights and attend an annual 
shareholder meeting, the shares are subject to control, transferability, and 
dividend limitations.
18
 Nevertheless, such restrictions have not stopped 
hordes of “Cheeseheads” from purchasing stock to “become a part of the 
Packers’ tradition and legacy.”19 For nearly a century, the Green Bay 
Packers have taken advantage of their corporate structure to regain 
financial stability in the face of insolvency, construct new facilities, and 
maintain and renovate the numerous faces of their stadium, Lambeau 
Field.
20
 Although this community-based ownership structure provides no 
true financial return for its investors, the Green Bay Packers capitalized on 
an opportunity to tap into a previously undiscovered and underutilized 
source of capital while providing intangible value to its shareholders. 
The third model, and the central focus of this Note, is what Jorge 
Garrett and Bryan Green coin a “sports team corporation”21—a sports 
team company that is publicly traded, independent of its relationship with 
another publicly traded corporate entity. Perhaps the most critical 
distinction between a sports franchise owned by a publicly traded 
company (indirectly traded) and the third model, a sports team 
corporation
22
 (one that is independently publicly traded), lies in its primary 
source of revenue.
23
 Professors Garrett and Green illustrate this point with 
an insightful example: 
[C]onsider the following example. Fox Group owns the Los 
Angeles Dodgers. When potential investors evaluate the possibility 
of investing in the Los Angeles Dodgers, their decision to invest 
primarily evaluates Fox Group’s ability to generate profits, because 
it is the business front that generates the majority of the revenue for 
the corporation. In contrast, when a sports team corporation owns a 
team, the investors primarily are investing on the basis of the team’s 
 
 
support the $143 million expansion of Lambeau Field, which includes new video boards, a new sound 
system, and nearly 7,000 additional seats. Id. 
 18. Schaeffer, supra note 8, at 206–07. 
 19. Id. at 206 (quoting Greenbay Packers, Inc. 1997 Common Stock Offering Document 2 (Nov. 
14, 1997)). 
 20. See Daniel J. Alesch, The Green Bay Packers: America’s Only Not-for-Profit, Major League 
Sports Franchise, 8 WIS. POL’Y RES. INST. REP. 1 (Nov. 1995), http://www.wpri.org/Reports/Volume 
8/Vol8no9.pdf. 
 21. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
 22. Id. at 71. 
 23. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/4
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ability to raise revenue—though they might also invest for other 
non-economic reason, such as love for the game.
24
 
I. ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
The success of sports franchises’ public offerings depends on the 
relative weight given to various advantages and disadvantages associated 
with the business decision. Several factors weigh in favor of adopting a 
publicly owned corporate structure, including instant capitalization, 
flexibility, and a competitive advantage to teams willing to pursue an 
initial public offering.
25
 One such advantage relates to the financing of 
team stadiums and subsequent renovations.
26
 In the United States, 
stadiums are typically publicly funded with taxpayer dollars.
27
 In fact, 
during the twentieth century, of the $20 billion spent on sports facilities, 
approximately $15 billion came from public subsidies.
28
 In the midst of 
the economic decline, however, taxpayers have voiced their disapproval of 
these plans.
29
 The public’s attitude mirrors that of local governments 
seeking to funnel public funds into true necessities. As a result, sports 
franchises have been forced to scan the economic landscape in pursuit of 
alternate means of financing large-scale stadium projects.
30
 Although not a 
sports corporation in its purest form, the Green Bay Packers illustrates the 
efficacy of utilizing a public offering to raise capital sufficient for stadium 
construction and renovation.
31
 
 
 
 24. Id. at 71–72 (citing Cheffins, supra note 8, at 645–48). 
 25. See Bacon, supra note 8, at 141–44; Cheffins, supra note 8, at 649–56; Garrett & Green, 
supra note 8, at 72–80; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 211–18; Stroz, supra note 8, at 521–22. 
 26. See Bacon, supra note 8, at 141–44; Cheffins, supra note 8, at 649–52; Garrett & Green, 
supra note 8, at 72–73; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 211–13. 
 27. Cheffins, supra note 8, at 650. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 75; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 212; see also Newman, supra 
note 2 (suggesting that Sacramento taxpayers’ sound rejection of public financing for a new arena 
contributed to the Maloof brothers’ consideration of relocation). At one time, Pacific Bell Park, home 
to the San Francisco Giants of the MLB, was the only privately financed major league baseball 
stadium built since 1962. See AT&T Park History, MLB.COM, http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com/sf/ 
ballpark/information/index.jsp?content=history (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); see also Marc Edelman, 
The House that Taxpayers Built: Exploring the Rise in Publicly Funded Baseball Stadiums from 1953 
Through the Present, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 257 (2009). For a modern example related to the 
financing of the Dallas Cowboys’ $1.2 billion stadium, see Aaron Kuriloff & Darrell Preston, In 
Stadium Building Spree, U.S. Taxpayers Lose $4 Billion, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 4, 2012, 11:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/in-stadium-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers-lose-4-billion.html; 
Seattle City Council OKs arena deal, ESPN.COM (Sept. 24, 2012, 11:04 PM), http://espn.go. 
com/nba/story/_/id/8422214/seattle-city-coun cil-approves-new-arena-deal. 
 30. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 75. 
 31. Id. at 90–91; see also, Want to be an NFL Owner?, supra note 16 (describing that the 
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In addition, a public offering affords ownership with a new level of 
flexibility and “enhances the ability of a current owner to liquidate part of 
his or her investment.”32 Whereas owners of privately held corporations 
struggle to find a market for their shares, or ownership interest, under a 
sports corporation model, team owners would not necessarily be at the 
mercy of the team’s fluctuation in value.33 The freedom of transferability 
supplied by the issuance of shares provides an exit strategy
34
 for current 
owners which can be a valuable asset given the deteriorating economics of 
private sports franchise ownership.
35
 Although “wealthy individuals are 
often motivated to own a professional sports franchise[,] . . . . [they] may 
soon be unwilling to blindly subsidize . . . losses from their own pocket.”36 
Moreover, under a public ownership regime, majority owners would not 
be forced to surrender their control at the expense of the liquidation 
opportunity.
37
 Depending upon the degree of initial control (measured by 
number of shares owned), the majority owner can recoup his investment 
on a portion of shares, yet remain in control of the organization.
38
 In 
essence, the sports corporation model allows the owner to “have his cake 
and eat it too.” 
A third advantage for sports franchises adopting the publicly owned 
corporate structure is its profound impact on on-field performance. 
Owners may allocate the revenue generated by public offerings to the 
team’s salary allowance, ensuring the opportunity to pursue the highest 
quality players and ultimately gain a competitive advantage.
39
 Although 
several American sports leagues function with a salary cap, which is 
 
 
offering is meant to fund renovations to Lambeau Field as did previous offerings in 1997). 
 32. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 77. 
 33. See Schaffer, supra note 8, at 215. (“A lot of the owners are . . . not as liquid as they were 
five years ago. In the past, a lot of owners have been willing to subsidize their teams, but as annual 
losses rise to $10 million, $20 million, or more, some owners are being stretched to the breaking 
point.” (citing Cheffins, supra note 8, at 655)). 
 34. Cheffins, supra note 8, at 653. 
 35. See Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 78; NBA Team Values, supra note 6. The Los Angeles 
Dodgers also recently filed for bankruptcy and fetched over $2 billion in a section 363 sale to an 
ownership group led by Magic Johnson, the biggest professional sports team sale in history. See 
Mason, supra note 7; Richard Sandomir, Group Led by Magic Johnson Wins Auction to Buy Dodgers 
for $2.15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/sports/baseball/ 
sale-of-dodgers-nears-a-resolution.html?_r=0. Moreover, in a recent Forbes independent valuation, 
twenty teams in the NFL are valued at $1 billion or more. NFL Team Valuations, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). Only the Dallas Cowboys, however, 
eclipsed the $2 billion mark. Id. 
 36. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 215. 
 37. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 77–78; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 215–17. 
 38. See Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 77–78; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 215. 
 39. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 75–77. 
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notably absent in Major League Baseball,
40
 “a sale of shares to the public 
could be a strategy ‘through which owners of teams falling behind in 
revenue have the opportunity to stay competitive in the market for free 
agents’”41 who tend to seek the most lucrative contracts. Given the 
symbiotic relationship between salary, talent, and revenue, teams utilizing 
this strategy would likely realize long-term gains.
42
 Small market teams 
such as the Oakland Athletics, featured in the recent blockbuster film 
Moneyball,
43
 could capitalize on this strategy to level the financial playing 
field opposite deep-pocketed teams such as the New York Yankees and 
Boston Red Sox.
44
 In addition to these primary advantages, the sports 
corporation offers other ancillary benefits, such as the ability to generate 
new fan interest through transferable shares, with others to be borne out of 
time and experience.
45
  
III. DISADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
A sports franchise contemplating “going public” should bear in mind 
the various hurdles and costs involved in the decision. Not to be ignored 
are the costs associated with the initial public offering itself, which 
typically constitute approximately 15 percent or more of the offering’s 
proceeds.
46
 The investment bankers serving as underwriters for the 
transaction will command a significant fee consisting of the spread—the 
difference between the offering price and the discounted price at which the 
 
 
 40. Major League Baseball has historically functioned without a salary cap. See Carol D. Rasnic 
& Reinhard Resch, Limiting High Earnings of Professional Athletes: Would the American Concept of 
Salary Caps be Compatible with Austrian and German Labor Laws?, 7 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 57, 
68 (2010); Natalie L. St. Cyr Clarke, Note, The Beauty and the Beast: Taming the Ugly Side of the 
People’s Game, COLUM. 17 J. EUR. L. 601, 628 (2011). The league’s newest collective bargaining 
agreement, reached in November 2011, remains without a salary cap. See Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/2012-16CBA.pdf. 
 41. Garrett and Green, supra note 8, at 76 (quoting Schaeffer, supra note 8 at 214). 
 42. As evidenced by the free agency market in every major sports league, the most talented 
players tend to “follow the money” and sign with the team offering the highest value contract, 
evidenced by LeBron James’s highly publicized departure from Cleveland. Assuming that sports team 
corporation stocks are closely correlated with on-field success, those teams adopting this model 
ultimately bring higher returns on investment to their investors. 
 43. MONEYBALL (Columbia Pictures 2011). 
 44. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 77 (“Note, however, that this advantage is premised on the 
underlying assumption that teams located in thriving economic markets will not follow the same path 
of going public.”). This statement assumes that these large market teams do not also utilize the sports 
team corporation model to the same extent and with the same success as smaller market teams. 
Otherwise, the gap between team economic values would likely still exist. 
 45. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 79–80. 
 46. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 219. 
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investment bank first purchases the shares.
47
 For example, of the $60 
million raised by the Cleveland Indians in the team’s initial public offering 
in 1998, $6.2 million constituted expenses associated with the 
transaction.
48
 Apart from the pure transaction costs are the high 
administrative costs, which have dissuaded some franchises from pursuing 
a public offering and forced others to implement a minimum purchase 
requirement.
49
 These costs include those required for annual auditing and 
accounting reviews, holding annual meetings, distributing and responding 
to shareholder proxies, and various legal fees associated with the Security 
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) annual and quarterly reporting 
requirements.
50
 
In addition, a public offering exposes corporate entities to the various 
requirements imposed by the SEC regulatory regime.
51
 Annual reporting 
and disclosure statements subject these teams to an elevated level of public 
scrutiny,
52
 which drives, in large part, the professional leagues’ anti-public 
ownership stance.
53
 Teams forced to comply with the SEC’s strict public 
disclosure scheme may find themselves with reduced bargaining power 
 
 
 47. Paying the investment bank by offering the spread between the discounted purchase price and 
the initial offering price is just one of many ways to procure the services of an investment bank. 
Oftentimes, for larger offerings, a conglomerate of several investment banks will pool resources to 
purchase the company’s shares and perform various functions for the client throughout the process. 
See JOHN C. COFFEE & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 76–78 
(Foundation Press 11th ed. 2009). 
 48. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 82. 
 49. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 220. 
 50. Id. 
 51. The SEC requires, among other things, quartersly (10-Q) and annual (10-K) reports that 
disclose the public company’s financial statements. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308(a) (2011); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 249.310 (2012). In addition, the company must make other important ongoing disclosures such as 
the annual report to shareholders and Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.303 (2011). Professor Hillary A. Sale describes the SEC’s regulatory regime surrounding 
disclosure as “dictat[ing] what, when, why, and how much they must say.” Hillary A. Sale, The New 
“Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 144 (2011). In addition, the increased use of 
technology, blogging, and other mass communication devices allow for the dissemination of 
information at a rate never before experienced by corporations. See id. Moreover, the public 
availability of financial information may also have consequences at the negotiating table. Bacon, supra 
note 8, at 160; Schaeffer, supra note 8, at 221.  
 52. See Bacon, supra note 8, at 158–60; Cheffins, supra note 8, at 658–60; Garrett & Green, 
supra note 8, at 83–84; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 221–22; Stroz, supra note 8, at 530–31. 
 53. See Cheffins, supra note 8, at 656–58; Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 84; Schaffer, supra 
note 8, at 208. Although the NFL strongly advocates an anti-public ownership positions, its policies 
are believed to violate federal antitrust laws, leaving the league without much incentive to curtail 
public officerings such as the Packers’. See Drew D. Krause, The National Football League’s Ban on 
Corporate Ownership: Violating Antitrust to Preserve Traditional Ownership—Implications Arising 
From William H. Sullivan’s Antitrust Suit, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 175 (1992); Genevieve F.E. 
Birren, NFL vs. Sherman Act: How the NFL’s Ban on Public Ownership Violates Antitrust Laws, 11 
SPORTS LAW. J. 121, 134 (2004). 
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when it comes to stadium negotiations,
54
 player contract negotiations,
55
 
and other business decisions, due to the widespread availability of their 
financial data. Moreover, in the face of the new regulations imposed by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), sports corporations will be drifting into uncharted regulatory 
waters.
56
 
Franchise owners must also overcome the barriers imposed by their 
respective sports leagues, which function as private governing bodies. 
Currently, the NHL and and NBA permit the sale of stock to the public, 
subject to limitations such as restrictions on dividends.
57
 In addition, 
offerings may be subject to review by teams’ respective leagues in order to 
ensure compliance with their own bylaws and rules.
58
 Like the NHL, the 
MLB permits public ownership, but also maintains the requirement of a 
majority shareholder,
59
 along with restricted voting rights.
60
 Although its 
regulations are generally believed to violate antitrust laws, the NFL 
remains steadfast in its unwritten policy disfavoring public ownership, 
emanating from the league constitution.
61
 After judicial intervention, 
relating to the New England Patriots’ public stock sale,62 however, the 
 
 
 54. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 221. 
 55. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 84. 
 56. In response to the financial crisis of 2008, on July 21, 2010, the federal government passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301 to 5325) (Supp. 2011)). The purpose of this Act was to “reshape 
the U.S. regulatory landscape, reduce systemic risk and help restore confidence in the financial 
system.” Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman, Testimony on “Enhanced Oversight After the Financial 
Crisis: The Wall Street Reform Act at One Year” (Jul. 21, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
2011/ts072111mls.htm. Given the law’s infancy, much remains to be seen regarding the legislation’s 
effectiveness and implementation. 
 57. Bacon, supra note 8, at 144 (explaining that the NHL restricts the teams’ abilities to 
distribute cash dividends). The NBA, on the other hand, allows its teams to make dividend payouts to 
stockholders. See Scott C. Lascari, The Latest Revenue Generator: Stock Sales by Professional Sports 
Franchises, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 445, 453 (1999). 
 58. See, e.g., Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League (Rev. 2006), available at 
static.nfl.com/static/content//public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); Major 
League Constitution (Rev. 2008), available at http://www.bizofbaseball/docs/MLConstitutionJune 
2005Update.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2013); Constitution of National Hockey League, available at 
www.bizofhockey.com/docs/NHLConsitution.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2013); Bylaws of National 
Hockey League, available at http://bizofhockey.com/docs/NHLBy-Laws.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 
2013). 
 59. Major League Baseball requires that no team distribute more than forty-nine percent of its 
ownership interests in public stock. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 208. 
 60. Bacon, supra note 8, at 145. 
 61. Id. Article 3.5 of the NFL Constitution “prohibits corporate ownership of franchises, and 75 
[percent] of NFL owners must approve all transfers of ownership interests in NFL clubs.” Schaffer, 
supra note 8, at 209 & n.48; see also Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1095 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
 62. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d 1091 (upholding antitrust violations on remand in federal district 
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NFL’s resistance to public ownership has lost traction.63 Perhaps the 
largest cost of “going public,” viewed from the owner’s box, is the 
imposition of fiduciary duties and responsibilities to shareholders.
64
 While 
viewed from the owner’s perspective as a consequence of his decision, 
these duties immediately arm shareholders with a means to ensure that 
front office decisions are properly made, whether they are to re-sign a 
player, build a new stadium, or raise ticket prices. This system of checks 
and balances between corporate fiduciaries and shareholders is addressed 
in the sections that follow, as sports franchises provoke unique issues 
within the realm of corporate law. 
IV. CORPORATIONS, FIDUCIARY DUTIES, AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE 
Corporations have long been considered legal fictions, existing merely 
as paper ghosts.
65
 Over two centuries ago, the Supreme Court identified 
the modern corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law.”66 Even in the midst of the 
Industrial Revolution, the Court anticipated a centuries-long debate over 
 
 
court). 
 63. Bacon, supra note 8, at 145–46. 
 64. See Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 84–86; Schaffer, supra note 8, at 227–29. 
 65. Corporations derive their powers from state corporation statutes that subtly vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The evolution of the corporate form has led to the adoption of limited 
liability company statutes as well as benefit corporation statutes. For examples of limited liability 
company statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to 29-857 (2008 & Supp. 2012) and IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to 23-18-13-1 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). For examples of a benefit 
corporation statute, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, §§ 1–16 (2012) and CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–
14631 (West Supp. 2013). 
 66. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). The Supreme 
Court went on to describe the characteristics of a corporation: 
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its 
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.  
 . . . .  
 . . . [A]t common law, [a corporation] is a collection of individuals, united into one 
collective body under a special name, and possessing certain immunities, privileges and 
capacities, in its collective character, which do not belong to the natural persons composing it. 
Among other things, it possesses the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting by the 
collected vote or will of its component members, and of suing and being sued in all things 
touching its corporate rights and duties. It is, in short, an artificial person, existing in 
contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchiseswhich, though they 
must be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet considered as 
subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage. Hence, such a 
corporation may sue and be sued by its own members, and may contract with them in the 
same manner, as with any strangers. 
Id. at 636, 667–68. 
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the “personhood” of the corporate entity, stating that a corporation, though 
purely artificial, operated “as distinctly as if it were a real personage.”67 
Since then, the Supreme Court has eroded the once firm constitutional line 
between persons and corporations,
68
 now affording them many of the same 
rights granted to natural persons. The most notable characteristic of 
corporations, however, is the inherent partition between ownership, 
granted to the stockholders, and control, given to the executive committee 
and management. Fiduciary duties, borne out of both statutory
69
 and 
common law,
70
 regulate this relationship and define the operating limits of 
those wielding control as well as the rights of corporate owners. 
A. Fiduciary Duties 
As currently structured, the owner of a professional sports team “owes 
no duties to fans.”71 Although fans fund the team (and owner) when they 
invade the concourse and empty their wallets at the team shop and 
overpriced concession stands, they remain without any guarantee that the 
owner has their best interests at heart. Some have argued that sports 
franchise owners, in fact, do owe fiduciary duties to the general public 
 
 
 67. Id. at 667; see also Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 562 (1830) (“The great 
object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and 
changing body of men.”). 
 68. The Supreme Court first explicitly equated corporations with natural persons in County of 
Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). Just two years later, the 
Court again imputed the characteristics of personhood to corporations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 
(1888) (holding that, with respect to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“[u]nder the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a private corporation is included”); see also 
Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 253 (1906), (finding that a corporation “may invoke 
the protection of [the equal protection] clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Moreover, corporations 
continue to gain recognition from the Supreme Court of their fundamental rights flowing from the 
protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 770 (1978) (“Freedom of speech and the other freedoms encompassed by the First 
Amendment always have been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the 
Due Process Clause, . . . and the Court has not identified a separate source for the right when it has 
been asserted by corporations.” (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)); Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that drawing upon corporate funds for election-
related expenditures constitutes a valid exercise of a corporation’s freedom of speech). 
 69. The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) points to the substantive division between 
corporate ownership and control in § 141(a), which states: “The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2011).  
 70. Other corporate law concepts, such as the business judgment rule, are creatures of Delaware 
(or other applicable state) common law.  
 71. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 227. 
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when analyzed as a public trust.
72
 Alternatively, the sports corporation 
model, in addition to outlining various corporate formalities, imposes 
certain fiduciary duties upon its board of directors, which would largely be 
comprised of the team’s current ownership.73 Rather than create a 
fiduciary relationship between the owners and the general public, as 
suggested under the public trust regime,
74
 the corporate form substantiates 
the relationship between corporate directors and shareholder-fans. When 
“bound by fiduciary ties[,] [a] trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”75 The courts 
have since discerned two critical duties imposed upon corporate directors: 
loyalty and care. Under the sports team corporation model, these duties of 
loyalty and care would govern team ownership in the same manner that 
they serve as guideposts for director decision-making for the likes of 
Apple and General Electric. 
1. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty “defines what the directors are to seek to 
accomplish.”76 This duty encapsulates the affirmative responsibility of 
directors to act with the corporation’s best interests at heart and to place 
 
 
 72. Harris explains the qualities of sports franchises lending themselves to qualify as a public 
trust: 
Fans’ feelings of “ownership” of their home teams are deeply rooted in the phenomenon of 
pride in one’s hometown. The rights of ownership are not actual; there is no document or 
deed transferring title from owner to public. Rather, the feelings are more of a “beneficial” 
ownership, where the owner of record acts for the ultimate benefit of the beneficiaries—much 
like in a trust. The “deed of trust” . . . is implied. . . . This ownership may seem to be only of a 
symbolic nature, but, to any fan, it is genuine. A professional sports franchise, as contrasted 
with other businesses, engenders this kind of feeling of beneficial ownership in its fans. Often 
it repays the public’s support with an “income” or benefit which, while intangible, 
nevertheless, is real to the fans and bonds those fans all the more to the team. . . . 
Consequently, some ownership and management decisions can be guided by a sense of 
fiduciary responsibility to the public. 
Harris, supra note 8, at 255–56. 
 73. Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) 
 74. See generally Harris, supra note 8. 
 75. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 76. Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment Rule in 
Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1063. The duty of loyalty mandates directors: 
protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge,” while simultaneously 
“refrain[ing] from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, . . . deprive it of 
profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or . . . enable it to 
make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.” 
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
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the interests of the corporation above those of their own.
77
 Breaches of 
directors’ duty of loyalty typically arise in the form of a corporate 
opportunity or an interested director transaction. The corporate 
opportunity doctrine is meant to “‘preclude[] a director or officer from 
appropriating for himself a business opportunity that ‘belongs’ to the 
corporation.’”78 Thus, in the event a corporation fails to take advantage of 
a business opportunity, directors generally may not take advantage of the 
opportunity for their own benefit if: 
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; 
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; 
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; 
and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate 
fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his 
duties to the corporation.
79
 
In contrast with this corporate opportunity doctrine, a director may 
breach his or her duty of loyalty if shareholders demonstrate that a director 
participated in an interested director transaction. Such transactions “turn 
upon the involvement of the director in the contract or transaction to 
which the corporation is a party.”80 These directors “appear[] on both sides 
of a transaction or . . . receive[] a personal benefit from a transaction not 
received by the shareholders generally.”81 Importantly, an interested 
director transaction may be cleansed by the approval of a majority of 
disinterested board members
82
 or a majority of disinterested 
shareholders.
83
 
 
 
 77. The duty of loyalty “embodies not only an affirmative duty to protect the interests of the 
corporation, but also an obligation to refrain from conduct which would injure the corporation and its 
stockholders or deprive them of profit or advantage. In short, directors must eschew any conflict 
between duty and self-interest.” Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 
(Del. 1987) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 at 510); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 710 (Del. 1983)). 
 78. Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
 79. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996). 
 80. Shapiro, 764 A.2d at 277. 
 81. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993). An interested director 
transaction may also arise 
 where a corporate decision will have a materially detrimental impact on a director, but 
not on the corporation and the stockholders . . . . [because] a director cannot be expected to 
exercise his or her independent business judgment without being influenced by the adverse 
personal consequences resulting from the decision. 
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993). 
 82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2011); Shapiro, 764 A.2d at 277. 
 83. See § 144(a)(3). 
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Traditionally, the duty of good faith constituted an independent 
fiduciary duty
84
 “describ[ing] the state of mind of a director” with which 
he or she must act in accordance with other fiduciary duties.
85
 Recently, 
however, Delaware corporate law jurisprudence subsumed the standard of 
good faith under one’s fiduciary duty of loyalty,86 noting that a “director 
cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith 
belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”87 Good faith 
continues to be a nebulous concept,
88
 but it is most often implicated in 
connection with allegations of directors’ breach of their duty to monitor, 
alternatively characterized as director oversight liability.
89
 
Directors’ duty to monitor90 “is an obligation to prevent harm to the 
corporation”91 and remains in play with respect to both the corporation’s 
compliance with applicable law as well as the corporation’s business 
 
 
 84. See Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating that “a shareholder plaintiff assumes the 
burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of 
the triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due care”). 
 85. Furlow, supra note 76, at 1063. 
 86. See Stone ex. rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (finding 
the “obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the 
same footing as the duties of care and loyalty”). 
 87. Id. at 370 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 88. In fact, the concept of good faith in this context is defined in terms of its opposite, bad faith, 
which generally describes instances where “the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than 
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.” Ritter, 911 A.2d at 369 (citing In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). In the last decade, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has identified three categories of bad faith worthy of imposing liability. The first, “classic, 
quintessential” notion of bad faith involves “subjective bad faith” which unveils “actual intent to do 
harm.” See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 64. A second category of bad 
faith occurs “where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law.” See, e.g., 
Ritter, 911 A.2d at 369 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 67). Third, “where 
the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for his duties,” bad faith may be found. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 
A.2d at 67. 
 89. Justice Randy Holland considered violation of Caremark’s duty to monitor as a failure to act 
in good faith, and thus, a breach of the duty of loyalty. See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 732 & n.92 (2009) (citing Justice Holland in Stone v. Ritter, who wrote, 
“[T]he Caremark standard for so-called ‘oversight’ liability draws heavily upon the concept of director 
failure to act in good faith”). 
 90. Professor Hillary A. Sale considers Chancellor Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark, which 
formally solidified the imposition of directors’ duty to monitor, “one of the most prominent Delaware 
opinions of all time.” Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 
719 (2007). The duty to monitor continues to be “the duty most affected by federal statutory and 
regulatory changes.” Id. at 722. Furthermore, the duty to monitor epitomizes “the theories about 
agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and control.” Id. 
 91. Pan, supra note 89, at 720; see also, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, 
The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 561 (2008). 
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performance.
92
 Chancellor Allen, in In re Caremark, summarized the 
obligation as “a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, 
exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory 
at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with 
applicable legal standards.”93 The Delaware Supreme Court, in Stone v. 
Ritter, built upon the foundations of Caremark, outlining the two potential 
routes shareholder plaintiffs may take to assert what has become known as 
a Caremark claim for directors’ failure to adequately monitor the business: 
(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a 
system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its 
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks 
or problems requiring their attention. In either case, imposition of 
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were 
not discharging their fiduciary obligations . . . demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for their responsibilities.
94
 
The excessive risk-taking that characterized the subprime mortgage-
backed securities markets has caused directors’ duty to monitor to take 
center stage amongst recent shareholder derivative litigation.
95
 In the wake 
of the collapse of financial giants Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, 
corporate monitoring and oversight guidelines will continue to evolve and 
likely grow. As President Obama noted: 
[W]e have a financial system with the same vulnerabilities that it 
had before [the] crisis began. . . . [I]f there aren’t rules in place to 
guard against the recklessness of a few, and they’re allowed to . . . 
take on excessive risk, it starts a race to the bottom that results in all 
of us losing.
96
 
 
 
 92. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 95. See generally In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(dismissing a shareholder derivative suit brought against corporate directors, citing their failure to 
monitor, as well as wasteful investment relating to the unreasonably risky subprime mortgage debt that 
comprised a large part of Citigroup’s operating portfolio). 
 96. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Business Roundtable (Feb. 24, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-business-round 
table; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION 322–23 (2009) (“[N]o single bank, in the highly competitive financial 
intermediation industry, could justify to its shareholders reducing its risk taking . . . and therefore their 
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It is unlikely that excessive risk-taking among professional sports 
teams will result in consequences as severe as the economic collapse of 
2008. Nevertheless, the duty to monitor assumes an important role within 
a sports corporation’s governance structure because the sports corporation 
model shifts the directors’ focus to profit maximization and shareholders’ 
return on investment. In fact, numerous examples, to be highlighted later 
in this Note, illustrate the duty to monitor’s importance in the world of 
professional sports.
97
 
2. The Duty of Care 
When engaging in the decision-making process, corporate directors 
must do so under the auspice of the duty of care, which “defines how they 
are to pursue that goal.”98 The landmark case of Smith v. Van Gorkom99 
first explicitly introduced the duty of care as a limitation upon directors’ 
previously unbridled decision-making power: 
[F]ulfillment of the fiduciary function . . . . imposes on a director an 
affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a 
critical eye in assessing information. . . . Thus, a director’s duty to 
exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of 
care . . . .
100
 
In attacking a corporate decision premised on a violation of the duty of 
care, plaintiff shareholders must show that the directors were grossly 
negligent in informing themselves as to the decision.
101
 Plaintiffs find little 
success in shareholder derivate suits based upon directors’ breach of their 
duty of care due to the utilization of § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) in many organizations’ certificates of 
incorporation, which shelters directors from liability for breaches of the 
duty of care.
102
 
 
 
return on equity, merely because the risks that it and its competitors were taking might precipitate a 
financial crisis. . . . There would only be one effect of the bank’s altruism . . . the bank would lose out 
in competition with its daring competitors.”). 
 97. See infra Part VI. 
 98. Furlow, supra note 76, at 1063. 
 99. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 100. Id. at 872–73. 
 101. Id. at 873. Relevant to any due care analysis is the extent to which corporate directors may 
rely on reports, opinions, or other statements presented by other directors, employees, or outside 
professionals or experts. These opinions and expert information are generally protected by the business 
judgment rule such that directors may rely on them without threatening compliance with the duty of 
care. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2011). 
 102. In response to the landmark decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature, in 
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B. Business Judgment Rule 
Shareholders wishing to challenge a corporate decision are initially 
faced with the challenge of overcoming the business judgment rule 
presumption afforded to directors. An offspring of Delaware statutory 
law,
103
 the business judgment rule famously imposes “a presumption that 
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company.”104 Directors’ decisions will be 
largely immunized from judicial scrutiny,
105
 provided that they arrived at 
the decision within the confines of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 
The presumption of validity afforded by the business judgment rule will 
not apply, however, if the corporation’s decision “cannot be ‘attributed to 
any rational business purpose,’”106 providing another weapon in the 
plaintiff shareholder’s arsenal for attacking corporate decisions. Although 
shareholders face a high burden, and often fall short, the business 
judgment rule and accompanying fiduciary duties provide a useful lens 
through which to view sports franchise decision-making. 
 
 
1986, adopted § 102(b)(7). Furlow, supra note 76, at 1064. The statute allows corporate directors to 
include in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation: 
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its 
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that 
such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the 
director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not 
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; 
(iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an 
improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director 
for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
 103. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. The business judgment rule finds its origins in DGCL 
§ 141(a), which appropriates all powers of management of corporate affairs to the board of directors. 
See § 141(a). 
 104. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The business judgment rule applies only 
where the board of directors makes a decision and is absent from an analysis of a board’s failure to act. 
Id. at 813. The presumption may apply, however, when the board’s failure to act stems from a 
conscious decision to do so. Id. 
 105. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264, 266 (Del. 2000) (“Courts do not measure, weigh or 
quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. . . . To rule 
otherwise would invite courts to become super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business 
decisionmaking. . . . Such a rule would run counter to the foundation of our jurisprudence.”); Cede & 
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (holding when “the business judgment rule 
attaches to protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make, . . . our courts will not 
second-guess these business judgments”).  
 106. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
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V. IS WINNING CHAMPIONSHIPS A RATIONAL BUSINESS PURPOSE? 
As previously discussed, corporate directors are granted protection by 
the business judgment rule when their decision involves a rational 
business purpose.
107
 Jurisprudence surrounding the concept of business 
purpose suggests that generating profit for the shareholders is the primary 
goal of a corporation.
108
 Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted 
“constituency statutes” which effectively broaden the range of permissible 
business purposes and constituencies upon which the corporate directors 
may hinge their decisions.
109
 In contrast to a valid business purpose is the 
concept of waste, which, if properly alleged and proved by plaintiff 
shareholders, will strip the directors of their business judgment rule 
protection.
110
 Corporate waste functions as an “outer limit[]”111 to the 
application of the business judgment rule and arises when the directors 
initiate an “exchange of corporate assets for consideration so 
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any 
 
 
 107. See supra Part IV. 
 108. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself.”). In his 2010 decision, 
Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed this notion, stating, “I cannot 
accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize 
the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .” eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 109. Although not appearing in every state, constituency statutes are gaining popularity, including 
in the alternate form of benefit corporations. Currently, “benefit corporation[s] [are] recognized in 
Maryland, California (which also has the flexible purpose corporation), Hawaii, Vermont, Virginia, 
New Jersey and (as of February 14, 2012) New York.” Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable 
For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/ 
2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-charitable-for-profit-entity/. The Pennsylvania legislature provides a 
prototypical constituency statute that reads as follows: 
(a) General Rule. —In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of 
directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a business corporation may, in 
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they deem appropriate: 
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, including 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon 
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located. . . . 
(b) Consideration of interests and factors. —The board of directors, committees of the board 
and individual directors shall not be required, in considering the best interests of the 
corporation or the effects of any action, to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any 
particular group affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor. . . . 
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a)(1), (b) (West 1995). 
 110. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 255, 262–66. 
 111. Id. at 264. 
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reasonable person might be willing to trade . . . [and] where directors 
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.”112 
While sports franchises are “interested in generating profits,” their 
success is also based on the team’s on-field success and post-season 
achievement.
113
 The sports team corporation functions amid the tension 
created by these two competing motives, which do not always act in 
concert. Winning often comes at a hefty price. Consider the Chicago 
Blackhawks of the NHL who won the Stanley Cup in 2010.
114
 Although 
the team sat atop the NHL ranks, team ownership admitted that the team 
had run out of cash several times during the season and that it would take 
at least four years to remedy their financial situation after their 
championship season.
115
 The Florida Marlins of Major League Baseball 
experienced the same incongruous outcomes. In 1997, the team won the 
World Series, yet reported losses of $34 million.
116
 Conversely, Major 
League Baseball’s Pittsburgh Pirates are in the midst of nineteen 
consecutive losing seasons,
117
 but continue to make profits despite being 
cellar-dwellers.
118
 For a majority of big-market teams, however, 
generating profit and winning games go hand-in-hand.
119
 Nonetheless, as 
the sports corporation model gains momentum, courts will be entrusted 
with the task of untangling the complicated business model. For example, 
Joe Lacob, majority owner of the NBA’s Golden State Warriors, 
proclaims on the team’s official website, “We are all about winning.”120 
Under a sports corporation model, the Delaware judiciary may face an 
 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 86. 
 114. Jeff Z. Klein, Blackhawks Win First Stanley Cup in 49 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/sports/hockey/10flyers.html?pagewanted=all. 
 115. Melissa Harris, Exclusive: Blackhawks Finish Stanley Cup Season in the Red, CHICAGO 
BREAKING NEWS (July 30, 2010), http://articles.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010-07-30/news/285159 
31_1_wirtz-corp-s-wirtz-corp-rocky-wirtz. 
 116. Andrew Zimbalist, The Capitalist; A Miami Fish Story, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/18/magazine/the-capitalist-a-miami-fish-story.html?pagewanted=all 
&src=pm. 
 117. Gabe Lacques, Pirates Lose to Cardinals, Clinch 19th Straight Losing Season, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 14, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/dailypitch/post/2011/09/pitts 
burgh-pirates-losing-season-streak-continues/1#.UMnuwYPBGuJ. 
 118. See Alan Robinson, Financial Records Show Pittsburgh Pirates Win While Losing, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 23, 2010, 11:58 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/nl/pirates/2010-
08-22-1957305623_x.htm?csp=34sports.  
 119. Examples like the Chicago Blackhawks in 2010 and the Florida Marlins in 1997 represent 
outliers compared to the typical financial success of professional sports teams that experience success 
within their respective leagues.  
 120. THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS, http://www.nba.com/warriors/ (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
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issue of first impression regarding whether this pronounced corporate 
objective would satisfy the judiciary as a rational business purpose. 
Whereas a decision to increase ticket prices illustrates a tight nexus to 
shareholder profits (due to increased revenue), decisions to construct a 
new practice facility or to resign a player to a maximum contract represent 
more tenuous relationships to shareholder profits, which remain the 
ultimate goal of corporate existence.
121
 
VI. A NEW BREED OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT 
In the NBA’s recent lockout, Derek Fisher, the president of the 
National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), admonished team 
owners when he said, “We’ve run into situations where teams have either 
mismanaged spending, overpaid staff, or made decisions on rosters and 
personnel that weren’t in their best interest—things that we’re now being 
asked to take the hit for.”122 Armed with the ammunition provided by 
corporate jurisprudence, shareholders would be in a position to critically 
examine sports franchise owners’ decisions and to file a shareholder 
derivative suit
123
 or direct action,
124
 if necessary. The shareholder power 
that accompanies a franchise’s decision to go public will cause team 
owners to make prudent decisions in the shadow of potential litigation. 
Without the advantage of well-developed judicial commentary on the 
corporate enterprise, courts first dealt with the notion of “fan activism” in 
 
 
 121. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 122. Coon, supra note 6. 
 123. “Devised as a suit in equity, the purpose of the derivate action was . . . to protect the interests 
of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless directors and managers.’” J. 
Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 
676 (2008) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991)). A derivative claim is 
one that belongs to the corporation, which an individual or class brings against the corporation’s 
directors on behalf of the corporation. Zachary D. Olson, Direct or Derivative: Does it Matter After 
Gentile v. Rossette?, 33 J. CORP. L. 595, 598 (2008). In fact, “[t]he nature of the action is two-fold. 
First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a 
suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.” Aronson 
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). “The recovery in a derivative suit ‘must go to the 
corporation’. . . .” Olson, supra, at 598 (citing Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 
1031, 1036 (Del. 2004)). 
 124. In contrast to a derivative action, a direct action “is a claim belonging to an individual (or 
class of individuals) that is appropriately brought by that individual (or class) on his or her (or their) 
own behalf.” Olson, supra note 123, at 598. In this instance, the recovery “flows directly to the 
stockholders, not to the corporation.” Id. (quoting Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036). The initial inquiry as to 
whether a prospective plaintiff should pursue a direct or derivative action is, “To whom does the claim 
belong?” Id. An alternative inquiry is whether the shareholder suffered harm independent of damages 
to the corporation. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited 
Liability Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 93 (2006). 
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Shlensky v. Wrigley.
125
 For years, the Chicago Cubs failed to install 
lighting and schedule night games,
126
 which the plaintiff alleged was 
resulting in lost profits.
127
 In deferring to the directors’ decision not to 
install lights at Wrigley Field as a valid exercise of business judgment, the 
court found that the decision did relate to the Cubs’ financial interests with 
respect to the team’s property values and the potential effect on the 
surrounding neighborhood, which might affect the public’s willingness to 
attend games.
128
 Notably, in the context of a competitive environment such 
as a professional sports league, the court added, “it cannot be said that 
directors, even those of corporations that are losing money, must follow 
the lead of the other corporations in the field.”129 
The events surrounding LeBron James’s television special, “The 
Decision,”130 represent just a few of numerous recent transactions which 
shareholders of a publicly traded sports corporation could have taken to 
the court, literally. Might Cavaliers shareholders bring a derivative suit 
claiming that Dan Gilbert, the team’s owner, breached his fiduciary duty 
by failing to acquire enough talent to entice LeBron James to remain in 
 
 
 125. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 126. The Chicago Cubs, in fact, did not install lighting until 1988, at which point they played the 
team’s first night game in franchise history. See Cubs Timeline, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE CHICAGO 
CUBS, chicago.cubs.mlb.com/chc/history/timeline10.jsp (last updated June 19, 2012). 
 127. The plaintiff specifically alleged that the scheduling of night games by other franchises was 
done specifically to maximize attendance and therefore maximize revenue and income. Wrigley, 237 
N.E.2d at 777. Moreover, he alleged, “if the directors continue to refuse to install lights at Wrigley 
Field and schedule night baseball games, the Cubs will continue to sustain comparable losses and its 
financial condition will continue to deteriorate.” Id. 
 128. Id. at 780–81. 
 129. Id. at 781. 
 130. The summer of 2010 saw NBA owners and player agents circling the star-infested waters of 
the free agency market. Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, Amar’e Stoudemire, Paul Pierce and Dirk 
Nowitzki, in addition to Rudy Gay and Joe Johnson, headlined a star-studded cast of free agents. Ian 
Thomsen, Bracing for the 2010 Sweepstakes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 20, 2008, 1:10 PM), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/ian_thomsen/11/20/free.agent.primer/index.html.  
Nevertheless, LeBron James stole the limelight when he formally announced his decision to leave the 
Cleveland Cavaliers and to “take [his] talents to South Beach and join the Miami Heat” as part of a 
one-hour ESPN special. LeBron James’ Decision: The Transcript, ESPN.COM (July 8, 2010, 11:35 
PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/17853/lebron-james-decision-the-transcript. James’s 
appearance on The Decision provoked unbridled hostility amongst fans in Cleveland and quickly 
branded LeBron James a “villain.” In an interview that followed the television event, James reflected: 
I would probably change a lot of it. The fact of having a whole TV special, and people getting 
the opportunity to watch me make a decision on where I wanted to play, I probably would 
change that. Because I can now look and see if the shoe was on the other foot and I was a fan, 
and I was very passionate about one player, and he decided to leave, I would be upset too 
about the way he handled it. . . . It basically turned me into somebody I wasn’t. 
Tom Weir, LeBron James Expresses Regrets about ‘The Decision,’ USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2011, 1:57 
PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2011/12/lebron-james-expresses-regrets-
about-the-decision/1. 
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Cleveland? Considering the fact that James’s departure meant a loss of 
approximately $100 million according to some, while saddling local 
businesses with $48 million in losses—$150 million including the 
playoffs—the argument can be made that Gilbert’s duty of loyalty 
required him to do everything in his power to retain LeBron James in 
order to maintain the profitability of the Cleveland Cavaliers.
131
 
The sports corporation model may have kept the Los Angeles Dodgers 
out of bankruptcy. In October 2011, Major League Baseball filed a 
complaint alleging that owner Frank McCourt “looted” nearly $190 
million from the team to pay personal obligations, among other personal 
uses.
132
 Appropriating corporate funds for personal use represents a clear 
example of a breach of a director’s duty of loyalty.133 The astute investor 
or well-informed fan, by initiating a shareholder derivative lawsuit at the 
first suggestion of McCourt’s improper behavior, could have played a 
large role in possibly preventing the team’s 2011 bankruptcy by limiting 
the magnitude of McCourt’s financial misappropriation. 
Similarly, decisions to sign minimal contributors to outlandish 
contracts would also be subjected to scrutiny under the waste exception to 
directorial protection of the business judgment rule.
134
 In 2010, the NBA’s 
Phoenix Suns acquired small forward Josh Childress as part of a trade
135
 
and agreed to pay him $33.5 million over five years.
136
 As a result of his 
poor performance, Childress saw action in only fifty-four of eighty-two 
 
 
 131. Robert Schoenberger & Teresa Dixon Murray, How Much is LeBron James Worth to 
Northeast Ohio?, CLEVELAND.COM (June 28, 2010, 6:53 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/business/in 
dex.ssf/2010/06/how_much_is_lebron_james_worth.html. But see Kurt Badenhausen, Cavaliers’ 
Profit Soars Without LeBron James, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kurtbadenhausen/2011/01/27/cavaliers-profits-soar-without-lebron-james/. 
 132. MLB, Frank McCourt Trade Legal Jabs, ESPN.COM (Oct. 25, 2011, 5:10 PM) http://espn.go 
.com/los-angeles/mlb/story/_/id/7146959/major-league-baseball-claims-frank-mccourt-took-190m-los-
angeles-dodgers. 
 133. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 134. See supra Part V. 
 135. Associated Press, Childress Traded to Phoenix, ESPN.COM (July 14, 2010, 4:54 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=5380252. 
 136. Josh Childress, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nba/phoenix-suns/josh-childress/ (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2012). A “sign-and-trade” in the NBA refers to a free agent’s decision to sign with his 
most recent team that can offer the player more money over a longer period of time than a new team 
could offer under the collective bargaining agreement. That player, after signing with their previous 
team, is subsequently traded, under contract, to another team. This exchange allows the acquiriring 
team to receive a player that it would not otherwise be able to afford given the league’s salary cap 
restrictions. For an example of a recent high-profile sign-and-trade deal involving the Phoenix Suns’s 
Steve Nash and the Los Angeles Lakers, see Ethan Sherwood Strauss, NBA Free Agency 2012: Do 
Sign-and-Trade Deals Undermine the New CBA?, BLEACHER REPORT (July 11, 2012), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1255130-nba-free-agency-2012-why-sign-and-trade-deals-make-the-
new-cba-worth less. 
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games during the regular season and averaged only five points per game, 
after totaling nearly twelve points per game the previous season with the 
Atlanta Hawks.
137
 In the absence of any connection to profitability or even 
to winning games, the Suns’ front office decision to sign Childress serves 
as another example of the application of fiduciary principles courts would 
need to address in the context of sports team corporations. 
Other decisions, such as one not to increase ticket prices in order to 
maintain their affordability, would present the courts with new questions 
regarding the team’s profit motive.138 But, it may be the case that a 
reduction in ticket prices would actually improve the team’s financial 
prospects.
139
 The construction of a new practice facility or weight room, 
while unrelated to profitability, is designed to improve the team’s on-field 
performance. Might these directorial decisions fail judicial scrutiny as 
well? The critical question then “becomes what ‘form of success will be 
applied to a sports franchise that has gone public.’”140 
Several recent examples also illuminate the role of the duty to monitor 
in sports team corporation ownership decision-making. Plaxico Burress, a 
heralded wide receiver, formerly of the Super Bowl champion New York 
Giants, was imprisoned for two years after pleading guilty to a felony 
weapons charge.
141
 The organization ultimately failed to resign Burress 
and instead missed the playoffs altogether during the two seasons 
following Burress’s incarceration.142 Given the corporate directors’ duty to 
protect the corporation from harm stemming from illegal activities, did 
John Mara and Steve Tisch, current owners of the team,
143
 breach their 
fiduciary duties in failing to monitor their players’ extracurricular 
activities? Presumably, the team lacked a reporting or oversight system to 
monitor athletes’ use or ownership of handguns. Compare this isolated 
 
 
 137. Josh Childress Stats, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/nba/player/stats/_/id/2373/josh-chil 
dress (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).  
 138. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 86. 
 139. Upon completion of the New York Yankees’ new stadium, ticket prices remained so high 
that the team had trouble selling season ticket packages. As a result, the front office actually reduced 
ticket prices in order to induce fans to purchase tickets and ultimately improve the team’s profits. See 
Richard Sandomir, Yankees Slash the Price of Top Tickets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.ny 
times.com/2009/04/29/sports/baseball/29tickets.html. 
 140. Garrett & Green, supra note 8, at 86 (citation omitted). 
 141. John Eligon, Burress Will Receive 2-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/nyregion/21burress.html. 
 142. Ohm Youngmisuk, Osi: Giants Not the Same without Plax, ESPN.COM (Feb. 5, 2011, 9:40 
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/news/story?id=6091581. 
 143. THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NEW YORK GIANTS, http://www.giants.com/team/staff.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
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incident with the startling information uncovered in The Mitchell Report
144
 
that named a countless number of Major League Baseball players, 
including José Canseco, Roger Clemens, Ken Caminiti, and Barry Bonds 
(former league MVPs), who used steroids or performance-enhancing drugs 
during their careers.
145
  
Since 1991, Major League Baseball’s Drug Policy has covered 
performance enhancing substances expressly. That policy states in 
part: “If any club covers up or fails to disclose to [the 
Commissioner’s] office any information concerning drug use by a 
player, the Club will be fined in an amount up to $2 million, the 
highest allowable amount under the Major League Constitution.”146  
The Mitchell Report suggested that teams failed to implement any kind of 
reporting system within the clubhouse walls.
147
 Does this qualify as a 
“sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight— . . . an 
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting 
system exists”148 such that team shareholders could establish a lack of 
good faith essential to oversight liability? Undoubtedly, the sports team 
corporation presents a host of novel applications of traditional corporate 
law doctrines. 
 
 
 144. In response to the controversies unearthed in the book, Game of Shadows, which chronicled 
the use of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs in Major League Baseball, former Senator 
George Mitchell spearheaded an independent government investigation into the use of performance-
enhancing drugs (PEDs) in the major leagues. Once completed, the Mitchell Report charged seven 
MVPs and thirty-one all-stars with having used some form of steroids or performance-enhancing 
substance. Mitchell Report: Baseball Slow to React to Players’ Steroid Use, ESPN.COM (Dec. 14, 
2007, 11:29 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153509. 
 145. See Players Listed in the Mitchell Commission Report, ESPN.COM (Dec. 13, 2007, 9:17 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153646.  
 146. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING 
SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 292–93 (2007), available at http://files.mlb 
.com/mitchrpt.pdf. Most recently, the Milwaukee Brewers’ star left fielder and 2011 National League 
MVP, Ryan Braun, tested positive for performance-enhancing drugs. Mark Fainaru-Wada & T.J. 
Quinn, Ryan Braun Tests Positive for PED, ESPN.COM (Dec. 12, 2011, 7:32 PM), http://espn.go.com/ 
espn/otl/story/_/id/7338271/ryan-braun-milwaukee-brewers-tests-positive-performance-enhancing-drug; 
Bob Nightengale, Ryan Braun Tests Positive for PED, says ‘It’s BS,’ USA TODAY (DEC. 10, 2011), 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/dailypitch/post/2011/12/ryan-braun-steroids-50-game-
suspension-appeal/1. But see Tyler Kepner, Braun’s Name is Cleared, but Questions Linger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/sports/baseball/ryan-brauns-name-is-clear 
ed-but-questions-linger.html (describing Braun’s innocence due to a procedural error). 
 147. MITCHELL, supra note 146, at 293–94. 
 148. Stone ex rel. Amsouth Bacorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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VII. FIXING THE GAME: LLCS, MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, AND 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Sports franchise owners may be able to avoid obligations under their 
fiduciary duties with careful corporate planning. Several states, most 
notably Delaware, have enacted alternative entity statutes
149
 that provide 
the benefits of the traditional corporation with a newfound flexibility that 
only freedom of contract can afford. 
Importantly, these governance structures allow potential users to rely 
on the public for financing. Limited liability companies, which may take 
the form of member-managed or manager-managed organizations,
150
 are 
permitted to sell LLC “interests”151 that come with varying rights and 
privileges as outlined in the operating agreement.
152
 When publicly traded, 
limited partnerships, called “master limited partnerships”153 also allow for 
the establishment of various limited partnership interests,
154
 which can be 
organized into classes with varying rights and privileges
155
 and be publicly 
traded.
156
 
Delaware’s Limited Liability Company Act (LLC) and Revised 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (DRULPA) both espouse an explicit 
“policy . . . to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract 
and to the enforceability of”157 their respective agreements. This affords 
founding individuals the chance to draft and enforce various provisions 
tailored specifically to the organization’s purpose, finances, parties, and 
goals. According to the alternative entity statutes, among the issues “up for 
 
 
 149. Of these alternative entity statutes, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2005 & Supp. 2010), the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to -1111, and the Delaware Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-101 to -1210, have gained the greatest traction amongst 
both new and established organizations. For examples of alternative entity statutes, see supra note 66. 
 150. See § 18-402, which allows for either management structure. Sports franchises would likely 
be organized as manager-managed LLCs such that the owners retain membership status, while vesting 
the day-to-day affairs of the LLC in its managers, which might include its other executives, general 
managers, and coaches. 
 151. § 18-215(a). 
 152. §§ 18-302, -404 (allowing for the creation of classes or other groupings of members and 
managers, respectively). 
 153. See generally John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471 
(2005); Anne E. Conaway Stilson, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 479, 525 (1997) 
(explaining the nature of a master limited partnership). 
 154. § 17-218. 
 155. Id. 
 156. § 17-702 allows for the assignment or sale of a partnership interest, unless specifically 
addressed in the partnership agreement. 
 157. § 15-103(d); § 17-1101(c); see also § 18-1101(b). 
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negotiation” is the imposition of parties’ fiduciary duties to each other and 
to third parties.
158
 The Limited Liability Company Act states:  
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or 
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited 
liability company or to another member or manager or to another 
person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability 
company agreement, the member’s or manager’s or other person’s 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in 
the limited liability company agreement . . . .
159
 
The Delaware Limited Partnership Act contains similar language that 
allows for the elimination of fiduciary duties amongst its partners, limited 
partners, the limited partnerships, and third persons.
160
 This language 
stands in stark contrast to that contained in the Delaware Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (DRUPA), which plainly states, “relations among the 
partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the 
partnership agreement.”161 Still, all three Delaware statutes fix a baseline 
measure of conduct: the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
162
 
Sports franchise owners should be careful to explicitly enumerate 
which duties are owed and which are not, as Delaware courts have 
struggled to determine the default position of the alternative entity statutes 
since their inception. While the various statutes allow for the termination 
or modification of fiduciary duties, the question remains whether the 
fiduciary duties exist in the first place.
163
 For several years following the 
statute’s amendment in 2004, Delaware case law examining the issue 
failed to endorse a unified front. On some occasions, Delaware courts 
declared that, even in the absence of explicit language in the contractual 
agreement, fiduciary duties did not apply.
164
 In an overwhelming majority 
 
 
 158. Both statutes provide for the modification or elimination of parties’ fiduciary duties owed to 
each other and to the entity. See, e.g., § 17-1101; § 18-1101. 
 159. § 18-1101(c). 
 160. § 17-1101(d). 
 161. § 15-103(a). 
 162. DRUPA specifically prohibits a partnership agreement from “eliminat[ing] the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” § 15-103(b)(3). Similarly, DRULPA and the LLC 
Act also carve out the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing from elimination. 
See § 17-1101(d); see also § 18-1101(c). 
 163. See generally Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in 
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L. J. 221 (2009) 
(describing Delaware courts’ struggle to decipher the default position of the state’s limited liability 
company and limited partnership statutes with respect to fiduciary duties). 
 164. Chancellor Chandler, in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156 (Del. 
Ch. May 7, 2008), held, “In the context of limited liability companies, which are creatures not of the 
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of cases, however, the courts found that fiduciary duties occupied the 
default position for limited liability companies and limited partnerships.
165
 
Chief Justice Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court advocates the 
minority view that the body of the contract is the sole source of duties and 
obligations and must affirmatively call for the imposition of fiduciary 
duties.
166
 
Delaware and other states provide numerous organizational vehicles to 
current and prospective sports franchise owners, each with its own benefits 
and shortcomings. Yet among them all, the limited liability company and 
 
 
state but of contract, those duties . . . must be found in the LLC Agreement or some other contract.” Id. 
at *8. In the Chancellor’s view, the imposition of fiduciary duties required an affirmative statement or 
intent based upon the LLC agreement. Similarly, Chancellor Chandler again opined, “For 
Shakespeare, it may have been the play, but for a Delaware limited liability company, the contract’s 
the thing . . . that ‘defines the scope, structure, and personality of limited liability companies.’” R & R 
Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (quoting Fisk Ventures, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1). 
 165. In Twin Bridges Limited Partnership v. Draper, No. Civ.A. 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2007), Vice Chancellor Parsons held that “[u]nless the partnership agreement 
preempts fundamental fiduciary duties, ‘a general partner is obligated to act fairly and prove fairness 
when making self-interested decisions.’” Id. at *20 (quoting McGovern v. Gen. Holding, Inc., No 
Civ.A 1296-N, 2006 WL 1468850 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2006)). Thus, according to Vice Chancellor 
Parsons, fiduciary duties reflected the default position governing relations in a limited partnership. In 
the context of master limited partnerships, fiduciary duties appear to still apply in the absence of ane 
express waiver of limitation. See, e.g., In re Inergy L.P., No. 5816-VCP, 2010 WL 4273197 at *12 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2010) (“[I]n construing an MLP agreement, ‘principles of contract preempt 
fiduciary principles where the parties to a limited partnership have made their intentions to do so 
plain.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Twin Bridges, 2007 WL 2744609, at *12)). Vice Chancellor Noble 
also adhered to this default position in In re Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 
4273122 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010), when he wrote, “[I]n the absence of explicit provisions in a limited 
liability company agreement to the contrary, the traditional fiduciary duties owed by corporate 
directors and controlling shareholders apply in the limited liability company context.” Id. at *6. Yet 
another recent adoption of the default position came in 2011. Vice Chancellor Laster concluded, 
“Unless limited or eliminated in the entity’s operating agreement, the member-managers of a Delaware 
limited liability compan[y] owe traditional fiduciary duties to the LLC and its members.” Phillips v. 
Hove, No. 3644-VCL, 2011 WL 4404034, at *24 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2011). In a recent decision, Vice 
Chancellor Parsons reaffirmed his position regarding master limited partnerships, noting, “Only ‘if the 
partners have not expressly made provisions in their partnership agreement . . . will [a court] look for 
guidance from the statutory default rules, traditional notions of fiduciary duties, or other extrinsic 
evidence.’” In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder Litig., No. 6347-VCP, 2012 WL 3792997, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting In re LJM2-Co. Inv., L.P. Ltd. Partners 
Litig., 866 A.2d 762, 777 (Del. Ch. 2004). Newly appointed Chancellor Strine offers a convincing 
argument supporting default fiduciary duties as applied to limited liability companies in Auriga 
Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC, 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012). His conclusion largely relies on 
section 18-1104 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, which provides, “‘[i]n any case not 
provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity [including fiduciary duties] shall govern.’” Id. 
at 849 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104). Vice Chancellor Laster recently reaffirmed the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s position with respect to default fiduciary duties and Delaware LLCs in 
Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, No. 7304-VCL, 2012 WL 5949209 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 166. See generally Steele, supra note 163; Q&A with Chief Justice Myron T. Steele of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, PRAC. L. COMPANY (Dec. 1, 2011), us.practicallaw.com/3-515-1049. 
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master limited partnership stand out as offering maximum flexibility 
through freedom of contract, while permitting for the outright elimination 
of fiduciary duties, all while granting the owners the ability to flex their 
financial muscles in the public markets. 
VIII. FAN ACTIVISM IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
Once formed as a sports team corporation, franchise owners will be 
forced to combat everyday pressures associated with running a publicly-
owned corporation, including the risk of hostile takeover. Consider the 
Texas Rangers’ 2010 bankruptcy and subsequent sale as an illustration.167 
After deciding upon an auction to solve the team’s struggling financial 
situation that forced it into a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the Rangers 
entertained bids from Mark Cuban, the well-known media tycoon who 
also owns the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks, and Nolan Ryan, one of the 
greatest pitchers in MLB history who previously played for the Rangers. 
Ultimately, Nolan Ryan’s ownership group outbid Mark Cuban’s.168 
Nevertheless, the risk that Cuban’s group would outbid Ryan’s would not 
be one that Rangers executives could ignore in the face of their fiduciary 
duties. Under a sports corporation model, however, Cuban’s dream of 
owning the Rangers would be far from dead. In fact, he could easily 
implement stealth acquisitions of Rangers stock on the open market or 
engage in a public tender offer
169
 to force Ryan to recognize his substantial 
interest in the team. The adoption of the sports team corporation model 
may force new owners to evaluate potential defensive mechanisms
170
 to 
prevent takeover. 
Sports franchise shareholders would also play a large role in the 
context of corporate acquisitions. In the event the directors choose to place 
 
 
 167. See generally Stempel, supra note 4. 
 168. After a fierce bidding war, the Nolan Ryan-led ownership group, with a “bid worth more than 
$608 million,” defeated Mark Cuban for ownership of the Texas Rangers. Ana Campoy & Matthew 
Futterman, Nolan Ryan Group Wins Texas Rangers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2010, 9:25 AM), http://on 
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703748904575411033436250908.html. 
 169. If Mark Cuban personally accumulated 5 percent or more of the sports team corporation, he 
would be required to register with the SEC under Rule 13-D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1. If instead, he 
chose to acquire 5 percent or more of the outstanding stock of the Texas Rangers through a business 
entity tender offer, he would be subject to registration under SEC Rule 14-D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1. 
Statements under both rules require disclosure of the holder’s intent to take over ownership of the 
company. 
 170. Potential defensive mechanisms include poison pills (shareholder rights plans), the use of a 
staggered board, self-tendering, golden parachutes for key executives, as well as a supermajority 
clause requiring greater than a simple majority of shareholders to approve any acquisition, among 
countless others. 
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the franchise up for sale or relinquish their ownership, shareholder 
interests will be placed front and center.
171
 While the corporation’s long-
term strategy often factors into transactional questions, the moment a team 
owner (or the league, such as is the case with the New Orleans Hornets) 
declares that the franchise is seeking new ownership, the directors’ roles 
change.
172
 Rather than look to partner with or sell to the group that best 
reflects the team’s current goals, culture, and mission, the Revlon duties 
imposed upon directors require them to focus solely on maximizing 
shareholder profit.
173
 As the Delaware Supreme Court described: 
Unocal permits consideration of other corporate constituencies. 
Although such considerations may be permissible, there are 
fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may have 
regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the 
 
 
 171. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
 172. Id. In Justice Moore’s landmark decision, he articulates the point at which “[t]he directors’ 
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price 
for the stockholders at a sale of the company.” Id. at 182. 
 173. Id. The judicial landscape of the corporate takeover environment is typically analyzed under 
the “enhanced scrutiny standard,” first introduced in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946 (Del. 1985). Under this standard, the defendant directors shoulder the burden of proving that they 
had “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed” as 
well as that the defensive mechanisms they implemented were reasonable in relation to the threat. Id. 
at 955. Further, Delaware jurisprudence has built upon this foundation and broken the second prong 
down into disparate inquiries. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). In his 
opinion, Justice Holland opined the relevant questions as, “first, . . . whether the [action implemented 
by the board] was draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive and; second, if it was not 
draconian, . . . whether it was within a range of reasonable responses to the threat.” Id. at 1367. When 
responding to a hostile takeover attempt, many corporations engage a “white knight”—a friendly 
bidder courted to rescue the target from to original bidder. See CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 835 
(Wolters Klewer 6th ed., 2010). Nevertheless, there comes a point, as described in Revlon, when the 
corporate directors effectively place the corporation up for sale by engaging or soliciting offers from 
other, more desirable candidates. The Delaware Supreme Court in the famous Time decision added: 
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without excluding other possibilities, 
two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties. The first . . . is when a corporation 
initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization 
involving a clear break-up of the company. However, Revlon duties may also be triggered 
where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an 
alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company. 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). Subsequent case law has interpreted the phrase “without excluding other possibilities” to 
include a change of corporate control. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 
A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). Thus, any transaction that involves a sale of control, even if not a formal merger 
or acquisition, triggers the Revlon duties of directors to ignore outside constituencies and pursue the 
highest price for shareholders. Id. 
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stockholders. However, such concern for non-stockholder interests 
is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in 
progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the 
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.
174
 
The Seattle Supersonics’ sale175 illustrates the issues accompanying 
sports team corporations in this context. After encountering difficulty 
renegotiating the terms of the team’s lease of its state-owned arena, 
Seattle’s owners, led by Starbucks chairman Howard Schultz, agreed to 
put their team up for sale in 2006.
176
 Schultz openly stated that he “turned 
down higher offers from potential buyers that he felt would move the team 
immediately.”177 Under the Revlon framework, Schultz would have 
breached his fiduciary obligation to the team’s shareholders to achieve the 
highest price for the team and to reap the highest return for its 
shareholders. As Justice Moore added in Revlon, outside considerations, 
such as fan loyalty, are alien to a corporate auction.
178
 The only goal is to 
maximize profit. If, for example, an ownership group based in St. Louis 
offered a higher price for the team than their Seattle counterpart, Schultz 
would have been forced to sell to the group from St. Louis. In this 
instance, Howard Schultz would have likely faced a shareholder derivative 
suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty stemming from his decision to 
consummate the sale with the knowledge that higher offers had been 
made. 
Oftentimes, as the result of financial instability, the ownership group 
contemplates relocating the team.
179
 The sports corporation model would 
also promote fan activism in this context. Certain provisions in the 
franchise’s articles of incorporation can require a majority, or even a 
supermajority, vote of the shareholders to approve team relocation. 
Separate and apart from the decision to sell the team, the Seattle Sonics 
owners, who initially pledged to keep the team in Seattle, eventually 
relocated the team and its WNBA affiliate to Oklahoma City—leaving 
thousands of loyal, disgruntled fans behind.
180
 Under a sports corporation 
 
 
 174. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (citation omitted). 
 175. See Sonics tell NBA, supra note 2. 
 176. See Associated Press, Sonics, Storm Sold to Group from Oklahoma City, ESPN.COM (July 
19, 2006, 3:08 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2522944. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Revlon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(noting that when a sale becomes inevitable, directors’ only duty is to negotiate the highest price for its 
stockholders). 
 179. See supra note 2. 
 180. See J.A. Adande, Sonics Saga Sends out a Bad Message, ESPN.COM (July 2, 2008), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2013] TOSSING THE RED FLAG 1287 
 
 
 
 
model, shareholder-fans in Seattle, while simultaneously creating a new 
stream of operating capital for ownership, could have voiced their support 
through the shareholder voting process and ultimately kept their home 
team in Seattle. 
The current situation involving the NBA’s Sacramento Kings offers an 
insightful illustration of the potential application of corporate fiduciary 
principles in the context of team relocation. Swimming in debt and general 
frustration,
181
 the hotel tycoons, the Maloof brothers, contemplated the 
sale of their NBA franchise, the Sacramento Kings. Based on a price that 
valued the franchise at $525 million,
182
 a Seattle-based group led by 
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer, hedge fund manager Chris Hansen, and the 
Nordstrom family
183
 agreed in January 2013 to purchase a sixty-five 
percent stake with plans to relocate the team to Seattle and fill the void left 
by the SuperSonics.
184
 Sacramento fans quickly took to the social media 
airwaves to air their disgust upon hearing the news of the impending 
sale.
185
 Right on cue, Sacramento Mayor, and former NBA player, Kevin 
Johnson portended things to come when we tweeted “Bottom line 
Sacramento: it’s not over . . . #keepthefaith #playingtowin.”186 Johnson 
then went to work and engaged billionaire investor Ron Burkle and 24 
Hour Fitness founder, Mark Mastrov in attempt to make good on his 
promise.
187
 The group submitted a “competitive offer” to the NBA on 
 
 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=adande_ja&page=sonicsmove_080702. 
 181. See Dale Kasler, Maloofs’ Woes an Issue for NBA, Sacramento Bee (Apr. 30, 2011), 
http://www.sacbee.com/2011/04/30/3591030/maloofs-woes-an-issue-for-nba.html. 
 182. Sam Amick, Sacramento Kings Reach Agreement with Seattle Group, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/kings/2013/01/20/sacramento-seattle-maloofs-chris-
hansen-sonics-supersonics/1850631/; see also Ken Belson & Howard Beck, Seattle Investor Plans to 
Buy the Kings and Move Them, N.Y. TIMES. (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/ 
sports/basketball/maloof-family-selling-sacramento-kings-to-seattle-investor.html?_r=0. For more 
financial information about the Sacramento Kings franchise see http://www.forbes.com/teams/sacra 
mento-kings/. 
 183. See Amick, supra note 182. 
 184. Id. See also Belson & Beck, supra note 182. 
 185. See, e.g., Twitter Reaction to Kings’ Prospective Sale and Relocation, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM 
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://nba.si.com/2013/01/09/sacramento-kings-seattle-sale/; Sean Highkin, Kings Fans 
Take Fight for Their Franchise to Tumblr, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2013) http://www.usatoday.com/sto 
ry/gameon/2013/03/30/sacramento-kings-fans-tumblr-social-media-seatlle/2038863/; Keep the Kings 
in Sacramento, FACEBOOK.COM (last visited Mar. 30, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/pages/Keep-
the-Kings-in-Sacramento/137652962952855. 
 186. See Twitter Reaction to Kings’ Prospective Sale and Relocation, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM 
(Jan 9, 2013), http://nba.si.com/2013/01/09/sacramento-kings-seattle-sale/. 
 187. See Associated Press, NBA Receives Bid for Kings from Sacramento Group, (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nba.com/2013/news/03/01/kings-sacramento/bid.ap/index.html [hereinafter NBA Receives 
Bid]; Jack Robinson, Mayor Names Investors Bidding to Keep Kings, Sacramento Bus. J. (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2013/02/28/mayor-names-investors-bidding-to-
keep.html?page=all. 
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March 1, 2013 on what Mayor Johnson described as a “proud day for 
Sacramento!”188 
One week after submitting the bid, NBA Commissioner David Stern 
found that the “counteroffer to keep the Sacramento Kings from moving 
tot Seattle needs to be increased financially before the league’s owners 
would even consider the bid.”189 With that recognition, Mayor Johnson 
again pursued other avenues of financing and assembled a “true Dream 
Team [of investors]” and went on to say, “This Fab Four is a bracket 
buster.”190 The Sacramento-based group added Vivek Ranadive, the CEO 
of TIBCO Software,
191
 and Qualcomm CEO, Paul Jacobs.
192
 This new 
investor group hopes to catch the league owners’ attention with a new bid 
that will overtake the offer by the Seattle-based group. The two groups 
will meet in front of a committee of NBA owners on April 3 to advocate 
their positions ahead of the Board of Governors meeting April 18–19.193 
Though the NBA Board of Governors will be the ultimate arbiters of 
the bidding war, the vignette provides for a useful examination of the role 
of the competing Revlon and Unocal standards of Delaware corporate law 
in the sports corporation context. Should this be a case that calls for the 
auctioneering rationale of Revlon, the group offering the highest price will 
prevail, regardless of the decision’s effects on the team, its fan base, the 
arena, relocation costs, and other considerations. If, however, the Unocal 
standard might apply, a prospective board of directors may consider such 
“other constituenties” when evaluating competing bids. This developing 
story is just one example of the many ways in which the sports corporation 
model would transform corporate relationships as a result of the 
imposition of fiduciary duties upon its management. 
 
 
 188. See NBA Receives Bid, supra note 187. 
 189. Associated Press, David Stern: Sacramento’s King Bid Less than Seattle’s, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2013/03/08/david-stern-sacramento-kings-
seattle-sonics-supersonics/1974731/. 
 190. Associated Press, Paul Jacobs Joins Sacramento’s Bid, ESPN.com, (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/9098853/qualcomm-ceo-paul-jacobs-joins-sacramento-bid-keep-kings. 
 191. Sam Amick, New Potential Owner Emerges for Sacramento Kings, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 
2013), http://usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2013/03/21/sacramento-kings-golden-state-warriors-vivek 
-ranadive-mark-mastrov-ron-burkle/2007283/. 
 192. Id. See also Associated Press, Tycoon Joins Team to Keep Kings in Sacramento, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/2013/03/22/5284788/tycoon-joins-team-
to-keep-nba.html; Dave Kasler et al., New Lead Investor Joins Effort to Keep Kings in Sacramento, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/2013/03/22/5283532/new-lead-investor-
joings-efforts.html. 
 193. Bob Condotta, Sacramento Group Could Boost Chances of Keeping Kings with Arena Vote, 
New Investor, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/html/nba/2020640635_ 
sacramento26.html. 
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IX. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
A. The Sports Corporation as Legalizing Gambling 
Although the sports corporation model provides owners with an 
unlimited source of revenue in the general public, sports corporation initial 
public offerings create a negative externality unique to the sports world: 
the effective full-scale legalization of sports gambling. In 1992, the federal 
government enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
which banned any “lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme”194 based on amateur or professional competitive 
games.
195
 While the ban applies to all fifty states, the government exempts 
four states
196
 pursuant to a grandfather clause contained in the statute.
197
 
The widespread adoption of the sports corporation model would 
effectively legalize wagering on professional, and potentially amateur,
198
 
competitions through an alternative vehicle—the stock market. The 
viability of this threat to a sharply pronounced public policy rests on the 
critical assumptions found in the efficient market hypothesis
199—namely 
that stock prices would immediately incorporate and reflect information 
from the field of play such as wins, losses, trades, and key free agent 
signings. 
In the absence of data reflecting this relationship among American 
sports teams, numerous studies involving European soccer clubs
200
 traded 
 
 
 194. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2006). 
 195. See §§ 3702–3704. 
 196. Nevada (odds-makers), Montana, Oregon, and Delaware (parlay bets) are exempt. See 
ANTHONY N. CABOT & KEITH C. MILLER, THE LAW OF GAMBLING AND REGULATED GAMING 550 
(Carolina Academic Press, 2011). 
 197. § 3704. 
 198. This would require that amateur sports entities (athletic departments) be publicly traded and 
raise revenue through various offerings rather than rely on traditional fundraising and ticket and 
merchandise sales. 
 199. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 555 (deifning market efficiency to mean that “prices at any time fully reflect all available 
information” (citing Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 383 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“In an efficient market, . . . [information is] said to have been 
absorbed into, and [is] . . . therefore reflected in, the stock price”). 
 200. See generally Adrian Bell et al., Over the Moon or Sick as a Parrot? The Effects of Football 
Results on a Club’s Share Price, ICMA CENTRE (2009); Ramzi Benkraiem et al., Sporting 
Performances and the Volatility of Listed English Football Clubs (Montpellier Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper); Jason Berkowitz, Does Winning Really Matter? An Examination of EPL Club Performance 
and Earnings (Dep’t of Fin., Univ. N.C. Charlotte, Working Paper, 2011); Frederic Palomino et al., 
Information Salience, Investor Sentiment, and Stock Returns: The Case of British Soccer Betting, J. 
CORP. FIN. (2008). Recent headlines suggest that the link between on-court performance and stock 
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on the Dow-Jones STOXX Football Index
201
 support the proposition that 
stock prices accurately reflect and respond to on-field performance.
202
 
With this knowledge, the sports corporation inadvertently creates an 
avenue for sports arbitrageurs to realize short-term gains that would 
otherwise have been illegal under the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act.
203
 Further, this mode of trading would provide a new 
platform for legalized trading on information such as trade rumors or draft 
choices, which is neither banned nor contemplated under current 
legislation. Using creative investment mechanisms such as put and call 
options, short sales, covered calls, and the creation of synthetic stock, 
investors are provided the opportunity to participate in sports gambling 
cloaked in the legitimacy of the stock market.
204
 
Just as the introduction of stock mirrors the otherwise illicit sports 
gambling enterprise, so too does it foster an environment inducing greed, 
mischief, and covert transactions. While sports gambling revealed a dark 
side to athletics related to point shaving and game fixing, the otherwise 
legal introduction of publicly owned sports franchises presents the same 
issue merely by a different name—insider trading. Owners and players 
become insiders and all trade rumors, hints of relocation, draft selections, 
and other corporate news becomes subject to the powerful reach of Rule 
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. 
 
 
price may be found in the United States. See Ken Belson, Lin Soars, and So Does Stock Price for 
MSG, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/sports/basketball/as-lins-stock-
rises-so-does-msgs.html; Michael McHugh, The Jeremy Lin Stock Market: Up Goes Knicks-Owner 
Madison Square Garden; Nike, Too, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ycharts/2012/02/29/the-jeremy-lin-stock-market-up-goes-knicks-owner-madison-square-garden-nike-
too/. Even more recently, the Knicks’ decision not to re-sign Lin, a restricted free agent, proved to 
have a negative impact on The Garden’s stock price. After reaching $38.80 per share on July 5th (up 
from $29.49 on the day of Jeremy Lin’s first start), the stock has fallen almost 9 percent, down to 
$35.50, since the Knicks decided not to match the Houston Rockets’ offer sheet for Lin. Stephen 
Smith, As Jeremy Lin Heads South, So Does MSG Stock, CBS NEWS (Jul. 20, 2012, 2:05 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31751_162-57476864-10391697/as-jeremy-lin-heads-south-so-does-
msg-stock/. 
 201. Dow Jones STOXX European index was first introduced in 1998. See STOXX, 
http://www.stoxx.com/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 202. See generally Bell et al., supra note 200 (finding that match results affect share price in 
addition to other variables); Benkraiem et al., supra note 200, at 3–4 (suggesting that sporting 
performances “have . . . a significant impact on the stock market valuation of football clubs”); 
Berkowitz, supra note 200 (finding that from 1993–2008 game performance impacted stock 
performance of publicly traded clubs); Palomino et al., supra note 200 (finding that markets are very 
fast at incorporating good news and slower in incorporating bad news about game outcomes). 
 203. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 204. See generally Michael Kaplan, Wall Street Uses Algorithms to Make Sports Betting Like 
Stock Trading, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/11/ff_midas/ 
all/1. 
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B. Innovative Player Contracts 
Team owners may also take advantage of a liquid market to introduce 
innovative clauses into player contracts as a result of the stock value’s 
sensitivity to team performance.
205
 Rather than provide the substantial up-
front guarantee, negotiations may instead focus on the inclusion of stock 
options vesting over the life of the particular contract and subject to certain 
termination or good standing conditions. Players could likewise be 
protected. Perhaps free agency or restricted free agency may be grounded 
in the franchise’s continued good standing with the SEC. In the event of 
an SEC investigation or other proceeding, professional athletes would be 
granted numerous rights related to their continued employment with the 
team, such as the right to test the free agency market. Lastly, the potential 
for hostile takeovers and ownership changes creates a need to prepare for 
various contingencies. A change of ownership likely means a change of 
management or coaching staff, and can profoundly affect the employment 
or compensation status of the team’s players.206 These threats shift the 
focus to the inclusion of “tin parachutes”207 meant to protect the most 
important, non-executive employees of teams, like head coaches, in the 
event of a change of ownership. Clauses like these represent just a few of 
the possibilities borne out of the wedding of sports franchises and the 
public stock exchange. The widespread adoption of the sports corporation 
model will undoubtedly create fertile ground for creative lawyering by 
sports agents and team ownership alike. 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 205. This assumes the findings related to European soccer clubs (discussed above) are applicable 
to the market for American sports franchises. Although the phenomenon has not been widely studied, 
recent events involving Jeremy Lin’s emergence in the NBA suggest a similar link in American 
professional sports between on-field performance and stock price. See supra note 200 and 
accompanying text.  
 206. This has become a stronger concern given the new flexibility afforded the NBA’s “amnesty 
clause” included in the 2011 collective bargaining agreement. The amnesty clause allows teams to 
waive a player while preventing his salary from counting against the salary cap or luxury tax. Jeff 
Zillgitt & J. Michael Falgoust, NBA Amnesty Provision Provides Teams with Flexibility, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 14, 2011, 2:49 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/story/2011-12-13/nba-
amnesty-provision-provides-teams-with-flexibilitiy/51892272/1. Ultimately this allows team 
management to “get out of bad contracts.” Id.; see also Associated Press, Mike Holmgren to Leave 
Browns, ESPN.COM (Oct. 16, 2012), espn.go.com/espn/print?id=8511711&type=story (providing an 
example of front office turnover when a sports franchise is bought by a new owner). 
 207. Similar to golden parachutes, compensation packages that accrue to a company’s top 
executives in the event of a change of control or hostile takeover, a tin parachute offers compensatory 
benefits to some of the company’s key employees outside of the executive team. See O’KELLEY & 
THOMPSON, supra note 173, at 835. 
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The sports team corporation model, while currently lacking widespread 
adoption, should continue to gain momentum, especially in the context of 
professional sports teams and leagues experiencing financial turmoil. The 
model grants management a novel method of capital accretion, but 
sacrifices total control in the process and imposes substantial 
responsibilities upon those in charge. For the fans sitting in the nosebleeds, 
sports corporations, by issuing publicly traded stock, grant never-before-
seen rights to such shareholder-fans to hold team owners accountable for 
their business decisions in various contexts. Shareholder-fans take on an 
active role in the governance of the franchise, serving as a check on 
directorial decisions on everything from stadium renovations to player 
contracts. Sports team corporation directors and other team owners should 
realize that this business model incentivizes dual participation in 
management of the franchise. While team owners remain in the driver’s 
seat,
208
 they would nevertheless be accountable to shareholder-fans 
seeking both monetary and non-monetary returns on their investments. 
Operating within the confines of modern corporate governance rules is 
hardly a sacrifice when compared to the limitless opportunity for capital  
infusion into the franchise that allows a team to renovate a stadium or 
court a high-profile free agent. 
Zachary A. Greenberg  
 
 
 208. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
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